《Try to Be as Prepared as Possible for Opportunities and D》歌词

[00:00:02] Try to Be as Prepared as Possible for Opportunities and Disappointments - 英语演讲

[00:00:07] "Remarks on Class Day 2008" by Ben S. Bernanke,

[00:00:12] Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

[00:00:17] It seems to me, paradoxically,

[00:00:21] that both long ago and only yesterday

[00:00:24] I attended my own Class Day in 1975.

[00:00:29] I am pleased and honored to be invited back

[00:00:32] by the students of Harvard.

[00:00:34] Our speaker in 1975 was Dick Gregory,

[00:00:38] the social critic and comedian,

[00:00:40] who was inclined toward the sharp-edged and satiric.

[00:00:44] Central bankers don't do satire as a rule,

[00:00:47] so I am going to have to strive for "kind of interesting".

[00:00:52] When I attended Class Day as a graduating senior,

[00:00:58] Gerald Ford was President,

[00:01:00] and an up-and-coming fellow named Alan Greenspan

[00:01:04] was his chief economic adviser.

[00:01:07] Just weeks earlier,

[00:01:09] the last Americans remaining in Saigon

[00:01:11] had been evacuated by helicopters.

[00:01:14] On a happier note,

[00:01:16] the Red Sox were on their way

[00:01:18] to winning the American League pennant.

[00:01:20] I skipped classes to attend a World Series game

[00:01:24] against the Cincinnati Reds.

[00:01:26] As was their wont in those days,

[00:01:29] the Sox came agonizingly close to a championship

[00:01:33] but ended up snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

[00:01:37] On that score, as on others-disco music

[00:01:42] and Pet Rocks come to mind--

[00:01:44] many things are better today than they were then.

[00:01:47] In fact, that will be a theme of my remarks today.

[00:01:51] Although 1975 was a pretty good year for the Red Sox,

[00:01:58] it was not a good one for the U.S. economy.

[00:02:02] Then as now, we were experiencing a serious oil price shock,

[00:02:07] sharply rising prices for food and other commodities,

[00:02:11] and subpar economic growth.

[00:02:14] But I see the differences between the economy of 1975

[00:02:19] and the economy of 2008 as more telling than the similarities.

[00:02:25] Today's situation differs from that of 33 years ago

[00:02:29] in large part because our economy and society

[00:02:33] have become much more flexible and able to

[00:02:36] adapt to difficult situations and new challenges.

[00:02:40] Economic policymaking has improved as well,

[00:02:44] I believe, partly because we have learned well

[00:02:47] some of the hard lessons of the past.

[00:02:50] Of course, I do not want to minimize the challenges

[00:02:54] we currently face, and I will come back to a few of these.

[00:02:58] But I do think that our demonstrated ability

[00:03:01] to respond constructively and effectively to past economic problems

[00:03:06] provides a basis for optimism about the future.

[00:03:10] I will focus my remarks today on two economic issues

[00:03:16] that challenged us in the 1970s and that still do so today--

[00:03:21] energy and productivity.

[00:03:24] These, obviously, are not the kind of topics

[00:03:27] chosen by many recent Class Day speakers----Will Farrell, Ali G..,

[00:03:33] or Seth MacFarlane, to name a few.

[00:03:35] But, then, the Class Marshals presumably knew

[00:03:39] what they were getting when they invited an economist.

[00:03:42] Because the members of today's graduating class--

[00:03:48] and some of your professors--

[00:03:50] were not yet born in 1975,

[00:03:52] let me begin by briefly surveying the economic landscape in the mid-1970s.

[00:03:59] The economy had just gone through a severe recession,

[00:04:04] during which output, income, and employment fell sharply

[00:04:08] and the unemployment rate rose to 9 percent.

[00:04:12] Meanwhile, consumer price inflation,

[00:04:16] which had been around 3 percent to 4 percent earlier in the decade,

[00:04:20] soared to more than 10 percent during my senior year.

[00:04:25] The oil price shock of the 1970s began in October 1973 when,

[00:04:33] in response to the Yom Kippur War,

[00:04:36] Arab oil producers imposed an embargo on exports.

[00:04:41] Before the embargo, in 1972,

[00:04:44] the price of imported oil was about $3.20 per barrel;

[00:04:49] by 1975, the average price was nearly $14 per barrel,

[00:04:56] more than four times greater.

[00:04:58] President Nixon had imposed economy--

[00:05:02] wide controls on wages and prices in 1971,

[00:05:06] including prices of petroleum products;

[00:05:09] in November 1973, in the wake of the embargo, t

[00:05:15] he President placed additional controls on petroleum prices.

[00:05:19] As basic economics predicts,

[00:05:22] when a scarce resource cannot be allocated by market--

[00:05:26] determined prices, it will be allocated some other way--

[00:05:30] in this case, in what was to become an iconic symbol of the times,

[00:05:35] by long lines at gasoline stations.

[00:05:38] In 1974, in an attempt to overcome

[00:05:43] the unintended consequences of price controls,

[00:05:47] drivers in many places were permitted to

[00:05:50] buy gasoline only on odd or even days of the month,

[00:05:54] depending on the last digit of their license plate number.

[00:05:58] Moreover, with the controlled price of U.S.

[00:06:01] crude oil well below world prices,

[00:06:03] growth in domestic exploration slowed

[00:06:09] and production was curtailed--which,

[00:06:10] of course, only made things worse.

[00:06:12] In addition to creating long lines at gasoline stations,

[00:06:18] the oil price shock exacerbated what was already

[00:06:22] an intensifying buildup of inflation and inflation expectations.

[00:06:28] In another echo of today,

[00:06:30] the inflationary situation was further worsened

[00:06:33] by rapidly rising prices of agricultural products and other commodities.

[00:06:39] Economists generally agree that monetary policy

[00:06:45] performed poorly during this period.

[00:06:47] In part, this was because policymakers,

[00:06:51] in choosing what they believed to be

[00:06:53] the appropriate setting for monetary policy,

[00:06:56] overestimated the productive capacity of the economy.

[00:07:00] I'll have more to say about this shortly.

[00:07:03] Federal Reserve policymakers also underestimated

[00:07:08] both their own contributions to the inflationary problems

[00:07:12] of the time and their ability to curb that inflation.

[00:07:16] For example, on occasion they blamed inflation

[00:07:21] on so-called cost-push factors

[00:07:23] such as union wage pressures and price increases by large,

[00:07:28] market-dominating firms;

[00:07:29] however, the abilities of unions and firms

[00:07:33] to push through inflationary wage

[00:07:36] and price increases were symptoms of the problem,

[00:07:39] not the underlying cause.

[00:07:41] Several years passed before the Federal Reserve

[00:07:46] gained a new leadership that better understood

[00:07:49] the central bank's role in the inflation process

[00:07:52] and that sustained anti-inflationary monetary policies would actually work.

[00:07:59] Beginning in 1979,

[00:08:01] such policies were implemented successfully--

[00:08:04] although not without significant cost

[00:08:07] in terms of lost output and employment--

[00:08:10] under Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.

[00:08:13] For the Federal Reserve,

[00:08:15] two crucial lessons from this experience were,

[00:08:18] first, that high inflation can seriously destabilize the economy and,

[00:08:23] second, that the central bank must take responsibility

[00:08:28] for achieving price stability over the medium term.

[00:08:32] Fast--forward now to 2003.

[00:08:38] In that year, crude oil cost a little more than $30 per barrel.

[00:08:44] Since then, crude oil prices have increased more than fourfold,

[00:08:49] proportionally about as much as in the 1970s.

[00:08:53] Now, as in 1975,

[00:08:56] adjusting to such high prices for crude oil has been painful.

[00:09:01] Gas prices around $4 a gallon

[00:09:04] are a huge burden for many households,

[00:09:07] as well as for truckers, manufacturers, farmers, and others.

[00:09:11] But, in many other ways,

[00:09:17] the economic consequences have been

[00:09:18] quite different from those of the 1970s.

[00:09:20] One obvious difference is what you don't see:

[00:09:24] drivers lining up on odd or even days to buy gasoline

[00:09:28] because of price controls or signs at gas stations

[00:09:32] that say "No gas".

[00:09:36] And until the recent slowdown--

[00:09:37] which is more the result of conditions

[00:09:39] in the residential housing market

[00:09:41] and in financial markets than of higher oil prices--

[00:09:44] economic growth was solid and unemployment remained low,

[00:09:49] unlike what we saw following oil price increases in the 70s.

[00:09:55] For a central banker,

[00:09:58] a particularly critical difference between then

[00:10:01] and now is what has happened to inflation

[00:10:04] and inflation expectations.

[00:10:07] The overall inflation rate has averaged

[00:10:10] about 3.5 percent over the past four quarters,

[00:10:15] significantly higher than we would like

[00:10:18] but much less than the double-digit rates

[00:10:20] that inflation reached in the mid-1970s and then again in 1980.

[00:10:26] Moreover, the increase in inflation has been milder this time--

[00:10:31] on the order of 1 percentage point

[00:10:34] over the past year as compared with the 6 percentage point jump

[00:10:38] that followed the 1973 oil price shock.

[00:10:42] From the perspective of monetary policy,

[00:10:44] just as important as the behavior of actual inflation is

[00:10:48] what households and businesses expect to

[00:10:52] happen to inflation in the future,

[00:10:54] particularly over the longer term.

[00:10:57] If people expect an increase in inflation to be temporary

[00:11:01] and do not build it into their longer-

[00:11:04] term plans for setting wages and prices,

[00:11:07] then the inflation created by a shock to oil prices

[00:11:11] will tend to fade relatively quickly.

[00:11:14] Some indicators of longer-term inflation expectations

[00:11:18] have risen in recent months,

[00:11:21] which is a significant concern for the Federal Reserve.

[00:11:24] We will need to monitor that situation closely.

[00:11:28] However, changes in long-term inflation expectations

[00:11:33] have been measured in tenths of a percentage point

[00:11:36] this time around rather than in whole percentage points,

[00:11:40] as appeared to be the case in the mid-1970s.

[00:11:43] Importantly, we see little indication today

[00:11:47] of the beginnings of a 1970s-style wage-price spi1ral,

[00:11:52] in which wages and prices chased each other ever upward.

[00:11:57] A good deal of economic research

[00:12:02] has looked at the question of why the inflation

[00:12:04] response to the oil shock has been relatively

[00:12:07] muted in the current instance.

[00:12:09] One factor, which illustrates my point about the adaptability

[00:12:14] and flexibility of the U.S. economy,

[00:12:20] is the pronounced decline in the energy intensity

[00:12:20] of the economy since the 1970s.

[00:12:24] Since 1975, the energy required to produce a given amount

[00:12:30] of output in the United States

[00:12:32] has fallen by about half.

[00:12:35] This great improvement in energy efficiency

[00:12:38] was less the result of government programs

[00:12:41] than of steps taken by households and businesses

[00:12:44] in response to higher energy prices,

[00:12:48] including substantial investments in more energy--

[00:12:51] efficient equipment and means of transportation.

[00:12:54] This improvement in energy efficiency

[00:12:57] is one of the reasons why a given increase

[00:13:00] in crude oil prices does less damage to the U.S. economy today

[00:13:05] than it did in the 1970s.

[00:13:08] Another reason is the performance of monetary policy.

[00:13:14] The Federal Reserve and other central banks

[00:13:18] have learned the lessons of the 1970s.

[00:13:21] Because monetary policy works with a lag,

[00:13:25] the short-term inflationary effects of a sharp increase

[00:13:28] in oil prices can generally not be fully offset.

[00:13:33] However, since Paul Volcker's time,

[00:13:36] the Federal Reserve has been firmly committed to

[00:13:40] maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation over the longer term.

[00:13:45] And we recognize that keeping longer-term inflation expectations

[00:13:50] well anchored is essential to achieving the goal

[00:13:53] of low and stable inflation.

[00:13:56] Maintaining confidence in the Fed's commitment

[00:14:00] to price stability remains a top priority

[00:14:03] as the central bank navigates the current complex situation.

[00:14:07] Although our economy has thus far

[00:14:13] dealt with the current oil price shock comparatively well,

[00:14:17] the United States and the rest of the world

[00:14:19] still face significant challenges in dealing with

[00:14:23] the rising global demand for energy,

[00:14:25] especially if continued demand growth and constrainedsupplies

[00:14:31] maintain intense pressure on prices.

[00:14:33] The silver lining of high energy prices

[00:14:38] is that they provide a powerful incentive for action--

[00:14:41] for conservation, including investment in energy-saving technologies;

[00:14:47] for the investment needed to bring new oil supplies to market;

[00:14:51] and for the development of alternative conventional

[00:14:55] and nonconventional energy sources.

[00:14:57] The government, in addition to the market,

[00:15:01] can usefully address energy concerns,

[00:15:04] for example, by supporting basic research

[00:15:07] and adopting well-designed regulatory policies

[00:15:11] to promote important social objectives

[00:15:16] such as protecting the environment.

[00:15:17] As we saw after the oil price shock of the 1970s,

[00:15:21] given some time, the economy can become

[00:15:25] much more energy-efficient even as

[00:15:28] it continues to grow and living standards improve.

[00:15:31] Let me turn now to the other economic challenge

[00:15:37] that I want to highlight today--

[00:15:39] the productivity performance of our economy.

[00:15:42] At this point you may be saying to yourself,

[00:15:46] "Is it too late to book Ali G..?"

[00:15:49] However, anyone who stayed awake through EC 10

[00:15:53] understands why this issue is so important.

[00:15:57] As Adam Smith. pointed out in 1776,

[00:16:01] in the long run, more than any other factor,

[00:16:04] the productivity of the workforce determines

[00:16:07] a nation's standard of living.

[00:16:09] The decades following the end of World War II

[00:16:15] were remarkable for their industrial innovation and creativity.

[00:16:19] From 1948 to 1973,

[00:16:23] output per hour of work grew by

[00:16:26] nearly 3 percent per year, on average.

[00:16:29] But then, for the next 20 years or so,

[00:16:32] productivity growth averaged only about 1.5 percent per year,

[00:16:37] barely half its previous rate.

[00:16:40] Predictably, the rate of increase in the standard of living

[00:16:45] slowed as well, and to about the same extent.

[00:16:49] The difference between 3 percent and 1.5 percent may sound small.

[00:16:54] But at 3 percent per year,

[00:16:57] the standard of living would double about

[00:17:00] every 23 years, or once every generation;

[00:17:04] by contrast, at 1.5 percent,

[00:17:07] a doubling would occur only roughly every 47 years,

[00:17:12] or once every other generation.

[00:17:14] Among the many consequences of the productivity slowdown

[00:17:20] was a further complication

[00:17:22] for the monetary policy makers of the 1970s.

[00:17:25] Detecting shifts in economic trends

[00:17:29] is difficult in real time,

[00:17:31] and most economists and policymakers did not

[00:17:35] fully appreciate the extent

[00:17:37] of the productivity slowdown until the late 1970s.

[00:17:41] This further influenced the policymakers

[00:17:45] of the time toward running a monetary policy

[00:17:48] that was too accommodative.

[00:17:50] The resulting overheating of the economy

[00:17:53] probably exacerbated the inflation problem of that decade.

[00:17:59] Productivity growth revived in the mid-1990s,

[00:18:05] as I mentioned,

[00:18:06] illustrating once again the resilience of the American economy.

[00:18:10] Since 1995, productivity has increased at

[00:18:15] about a 2.5 percent annual rate.

[00:18:18] A great deal of intellectual effort

[00:18:21] has been expended in trying to explain

[00:18:23] the recent performance and to forecast

[00:18:26] the future evolution of productivity.

[00:18:29] Much very good work has been conducted here

[00:18:33] at Harvard by Dale Jorgenson.

[00:18:35] (my senior thesis adviser in 1975, by the way) and his colleagues,

[00:18:40] and other important research in the area

[00:18:43] has been done at the Federal Reserve Board.

[00:18:46] One key finding of that research is that,

[00:18:49] to have an economic impact,

[00:18:52] technological innovations must be translated

[00:18:55] into successful commercial applications.

[00:18:58] This country's competitive, market--based system,

[00:19:02] its flexible capital and labor markets,

[00:19:05] its tradition of entrepreneurship,

[00:19:08] and its technological strengths--

[00:19:10] to which Harvard and other universities

[00:19:12] make a critical contribution--

[00:19:14] help ensure that that happens on an ongoing basis.

[00:19:19] While private-sector initiative

[00:19:23] was the key ingredient in generating the pickup

[00:19:26] in productivity growth,

[00:19:27] government policy was constructive,

[00:19:30] in part through support of basic research

[00:19:33] but also to a substantial degree

[00:19:36] by promoting economic competition.

[00:19:39] Beginning in the late 1970s,

[00:19:42] the federal government deregulated a number of key industries,

[00:19:46] including air travel, trucking, telecommunications, and energy.

[00:19:51] The resulting increase in competition

[00:19:54] promoted cost reductions and innovation,

[00:19:58] leading in turn to new products and industries.

[00:20:01] It is difficult to imagine

[00:20:04] that we would have online retailing today

[00:20:08] if the transportation and telecommunications industries

[00:20:12] had not been deregulated.

[00:20:14] In addition, the lowering of trade barriers

[00:20:17] promoted productivity gains by increasing competition,

[00:20:21] expanding markets, and increasing the pace of technology transfer.

[00:20:26] Finally, as a central banker,

[00:20:30] I would be remiss if I failed to mention the contribution

[00:20:34] of monetary policy to the improved productivity performance.

[00:20:38] By damping business cycles

[00:20:42] and by keeping inflation under control,

[00:20:45] a sound monetary policy improves the ability

[00:20:48] of households and firms to plan

[00:20:51] and increases their willingness to undertake

[00:20:54] the investments in skills, research,

[00:20:57] and physical capital needed to support

[00:20:59] continuing gains in productivity.

[00:21:02] Just as the productivity slowdown

[00:21:06] was associated with a slower growth

[00:21:09] of real per capita income,

[00:21:10] the productivity resurgence since the mid-1990s

[00:21:15] has been accompanied by a pickup in real income growth.

[00:21:19] One measure of average living standards,

[00:21:23] real consumption per capita,

[00:21:25] is nearly 35 percent higher today than in 1995.

[00:21:31] In addition, the flood of innovation

[00:21:35] that helped spur the productivity resurgence

[00:21:38] has created many new job opportunities,

[00:21:41] and more than a few fortunes.

[00:21:43] But changing technology has also reduced job opportunities

[00:21:48] for some others--bank tellers and assembly-line workers, for example.

[00:21:53] And that is the crux of a whole new set of challenges.

[00:21:57] Even though average economic well--being

[00:22:03] has increased considerably over time,

[00:22:05] the degree of inequality in economic outcomes

[00:22:09] over the past three decades has increased as well.

[00:22:13] Economists continue to grapple with

[00:22:16] the reasons for this trend.

[00:22:18] But as best we can tell,

[00:22:20] the increase in inequality probably

[00:22:23] is due to a number of factors,

[00:22:25] notably including technological change

[00:22:28] that seems to have favored higher-skilled workers

[00:22:32] more than lower-skilled ones.

[00:22:34] In addition, some economists point to increased international trade

[00:22:39] and the declining role of labor unions.

[00:22:42] as other, probably lesser contributing factors.

[00:22:46] What should we do about rising economic inequality?

[00:22:53] Answering this question inevitably involves

[00:22:57] difficult value judgments and tradeoffs.

[00:22:59] But approaches that inhibit the dynamism

[00:23:03] of our economy would clearly be a step

[00:23:06] in the wrong direction.

[00:23:07] To be sure, new technologies and increased international trade

[00:23:12] can lead to painful dislocations

[00:23:15] as some workers lose their jobs

[00:23:17] or see the demand for their particular skills decline.

[00:23:21] However, hindering the adoption of new technologies

[00:23:26] or inhibiting trade flows would do far more harm

[00:23:30] than good over the longer haul.

[00:23:32] In the short term,

[00:23:34] the better approach is to adopt policies

[00:23:37] that help those who are displaced by economic change.

[00:23:40] By doing so, we not only provide assistance to those

[00:23:45] who need it but help to secure public support

[00:23:48] for the economic flexibility that is essential for prosperity.

[00:23:53] In the long term, however,

[00:23:57] the best way by far to improve economic opportunity

[00:24:01] and to reduce inequality is to

[00:24:04] increase the educational attainment and skills of American workers.

[00:24:09] The productivity surge in the decades

[00:24:13] after World War II corresponded to a period

[00:24:17] in which educational attainment was increasing rapidly;

[00:24:21] in recent decades, progress on that front has been far slower.

[00:24:27] Moreover, inequalities in education

[00:24:30] and in access to education remain high.

[00:24:33] As we think about improving education and skills,

[00:24:37] we should also look beyond the traditional K-12

[00:24:42] and 4-year-college system--

[00:24:43] as important as it is--

[00:24:45] to recognize that education should be lifelong

[00:24:49] and can come in many forms.

[00:24:51] Early childhood education, community colleges,

[00:24:55] vocational schools, on-the-job training, online courses,

[00:25:00] adult education -- all of these are vehicles of demonstrated value

[00:25:05] in increasing skills and lifetime earning power.

[00:25:09] The use of a wide range of methods to

[00:25:13] address the pressing problems of inadequate skills

[00:25:16] and economic inequality would be entirely

[00:25:20] consistent with the themes of economic adaptability

[00:25:23] and flexibility that I have emphasized in my remarks.

[00:25:28] I will close by shifting from the topic of education

[00:25:34] in general to your education specifically.

[00:25:36] Through effort, talent, and doubtless some luck,

[00:25:41] you have succeeded in acquiring an excellent education.

[00:25:45] Your education--more precisely,

[00:25:48] your ability to think critically and creatively--

[00:25:51] is your greatest asset.

[00:25:54] And unlike many assets,

[00:25:56] the more you draw on it, the faster it grows.

[00:25:59] Put it to good use.

[00:26:01] The poor forecasting record of economists is legendary,

[00:26:07] but I will make a forecast in which I am very confident:

[00:26:12] Whatever you expect your life and work

[00:26:15] to be like 10, 20, or 30 years from now,

[00:26:19] the reality will be quite different.

[00:26:22] In looking over the 30th anniversary report on my own class,

[00:26:27] I was struck by the great diversity of vocations and avocations

[00:26:32] that have engaged my classmates.

[00:26:34] To be sure, the volume was full of attorneys

[00:26:39] and physicians and professors

[00:26:41] as well as architects, engineers, editors, bankers,

[00:26:45] and even a few economists.

[00:26:47] Many listed the title "vice president," and,

[00:26:52] not a few, "president."

[00:26:55] But the Class of 1975 also includes those

[00:27:00] who listed their occupations as composer,

[00:27:02] environmental advocate, musician, playwright,

[00:27:07] rabbi, conflict resolution coach, painter,

[00:27:11] community organizer, and essayist.

[00:27:14] And even for those of us with the more conventional job descriptions,

[00:27:19] the nature of our daily work and its relationship

[00:27:23] to the economy and society is,

[00:27:25] I am sure, very different from

[00:27:28] what we might have guessed in 1975.

[00:27:31] My point is only that you cannot predict your path.

[00:27:36] You can only try to be as prepared as possible

[00:27:40] for the opportunities,

[00:27:42] as well as the disappointments,

[00:27:45] that will come your way.

[00:27:49] For people, as for economies,

[00:27:52] adaptability and flexibility count for a great deal.

[00:27:57] Wherever your path leads,

[00:27:59] I hope you use your considerable talents and energy

[00:28:01] in endeavors that engage and excite you

[00:28:04] and benefit not only yourselves,

[00:28:07] but also in some measure your country and your world.

[00:28:12] Today, I wish you and your families a day of joyous celebration.

[00:28:18] Congratulations.